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Abstract. We study an extension of the voter model in which each agent is endowed
with an innate preference for one of two states that we term as “truth” or “falsehood”.
Due to interactions with neighbors, an agent that innately prefers truth can be
persuaded to adopt a false opinion (and thus be discordant with its innate preference)
or the agent can possess an internally concordant “true” opinion. Parallel states exist
for agents that inherently prefer falsehood. We determine the conditions under which
a population of such agents can ultimately reach a consensus for the truth, a consensus
for falsehood, or reach an impasse where an agent tends to adopt the opinion that is
in internal concordance with its innate preference so that consensus is never achieved.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a, 89.75.Fb
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There has been considerable recent public attention in the US on the following
question: “Is President Obama a Muslim?” A Pew Research Center public opinion poll
in the US found that 19% of respondents answered this question affirmatively in August
2010 [1]. Independent of one’s personal views, there are two incontrovertible facts on
this matter: (i) the question “Is President Obama a Muslim?” has a definite answer,
and (ii) there is a lack of consensus on the answer to what seems to be a clear-cut
question.
What is the source of this lack of consensus? Does conflicting evidence exist? Do
people interpret the same evidence differently? What are the roles of the mass media
and fellow peers in influencing the beliefs of individuals? In this work, we focus on
peer influence by formulating a voter-like model in which we account for the possibility
that each agent’s opinion may be in concordance or discordance with an internal and
fixed set of beliefs. Our model incorporates two distinct mechanisms for an agent to
change its opinion: one is the desire for an individual to be in concordance with this
inviolate belief set, while the second is the tendency to agree with neighbors to minimize
conflict. Our goal is to shed light on whether global truth can ultimately emerge in a
socially-interacting population where the desire for internal concordance may conflict
with global truth. Our approach is in the spirit of work by physicists in applying
minimalist modeling to real social phenomena (see, e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5]).
The dichotomy between one’s private beliefs and publicly-expressed opinions can
take many forms [6]. One such example is H. C. Andersen’s fairy tale “The Emperor’s
New Clothes” [7], in which the Emperor’s absence of clothes is finally exposed by the
innocent remark of young child. The phenomenon of the spread of false norms has
recently been elucidated by a simple computational model [8]. In a related vein, Asch [9]
found that respondents to an uncomfortable question would conform to a clearly false
consensus judgment rather than risk the stigma of being viewed as deviant. Similarly,
white Americans overestimated the degree of support for forced racial segregation during
the 1960’s and 70’s [10]. While 18% of whites indicated that they favored segregation,
47% of these respondents believed that most whites favored segregation. Another
relevant example is the maddening feature that the general public has strong divergences
of opinion on issues for which there is agreement within the scientific community [11].
Motivated in part by these examples, we construct a simple generalization of the
voter model — the “partisan” voter model — to account for the competing influences
of social consensus and personal concordance. The classic voter model accounts for the
evolution to consensus in a population of binary and spineless agents that repeatedly
evolve by adopting the opinion state of a randomly-selected neighbor [12]. In our model,
we posit that each individual has an internal ethos — namely, a fixed beliefs on a set
of fundamental issues, and that each agent is more likely to alter its opinion to be
in concordance with this internal ethos [13]. We also ascribe a value to the opinion
states that we label as “truth” (T ) and “falsehood” (F ). Individuals evolve by voter
model dynamics but the rate of an update step depends on the direction of the opinion
change. An opinion change that makes an agent concordant with its internal ethos occurs
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preferentially to a change that causes discordance. As a result of interactions among
neighboring agents by voter model dynamics, an agent that intrinsically prefers the truth
can thus actually have a false opinion. The resulting model bears some resemblance to
a multi-state voter model of Page et al. [14], in which an agent can self-adjust its vector
set of opinions to be internally consistent in addition to regular voting dynamics.
In general, there are four possibilities for the opinion state of each agent (figure 1):
• An agent intrinsically prefers truth and is in the true state. Such an agent is
concordant.
• An agent intrinsically prefers falsehood and is in the false state. Such an agent is
also concordant.
• An agent intrinsically prefers truth but is in the false state. Such an agent is
discordant.
• An agent intrinsically prefers falsehood but is in the true state. Such an agent is
also discordant.
We define the densities of agents in these four states as T+, F+, T−, and F−, respectively,
each of which evolves with time t. The subscripts + and − indicate concordance and
discordance, respectively. The total density of agents that intrinsically believe the truth
(independent of their instantaneous state) is the time-independent quantity T = T++T−
(figure 1), and similarly the density of agents that intrinsically believe falsehood is
F = F+ + F−. However, the density of agents that happen to be in the true state at a
particular time is time-dependent quantity T++F−; this includes concordant agents that
prefer truth and discordant agents that prefer falsehood but happen to be in the true
state. Similarly, the density of agents that happen to be in the false state is F+ + T−.
The total density of agents of any type, i.e., T +F , is fixed and may be set to 1 without
loss of generality. Our goal is to understand if global truth can emerge by this voting
dynamics.
T
T fraction F fraction
+F_
+T F_
Figure 1. Illustration of the densities of the four types of agents, T+, F+, T−, and
F
−
. The shaded region shows the fraction of the population in the true state; this
includes a fraction T+ of concordant agents that intrinsically prefer the truth and a
fraction F
−
of discordant agents that intrinsically prefer falsehood but happen to agree
with the truth.
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We define the evolution of the agents by the following extension of the voter model:
first, an agent is picked at random and then one of its neighboring agents is picked.
When these two agents are in opposite opinion states (truth or falsehood), the initial
agent is updated with the following rates:
• A T agent that happens to have a false opinion changes to the true (concordant)
state with rate 1 + ǫt; a T agent that happens to have a true opinion changes to
the false (discordant) state with rate 1− ǫt.
• An F agent that happens to have a true opinion changes to the false (concordant)
state with rate 1 + ǫf ; an F agent that happens to have a false opinion changes to
the true (discordant) state with rate 1− ǫf .
That is, an agent changes to a concordant state with enthusiasm (as quantified by the
enhanced rates 1 + ǫt or 1 + ǫf for changing to the T or F states, respectively, where
ǫt, ǫf > 0), while an agent changes to a discordant state with reluctance (reduced rates
1− ǫt or 1− ǫf ).
To understand the evolution of the population by this partisan voter dynamics we
first study the mean-field approximation, where all agents can be viewed as neighbors
of each other. This approximation provides a useful starting point for investigating the
dynamics of the model on more realistic social networks. In this mean-field description,
the densities of agents in each of the four possible states evolve by the rate equations:
T˙+ = (1 + ǫt)T− [T+ + F−]− (1− ǫt)T+ [T− + F+] ,
T˙− = (1− ǫt)T+ [T− + F+]− (1 + ǫt)T− [T+ + F−] ,
F˙+ = (1 + ǫf )F− [F+ + T−]− (1− ǫf)F+ [F− + T+] ,
F˙− = (1− ǫf)F+ [F− + T+]− (1 + ǫf)F− [F+ + T−] ,
(1)
where the overdot denotes time derivative. The terms in (1) have simple meanings. For
example, in the equation for T˙+, the first term on the right side accounts for the increase
(with rate 1 + ǫt) in the density of concordant agents that are in the true state. Such
a change arises when a discordant agent that prefers truth interacts with an agent that
currently is in the true state — either an agent that prefers truth and is concordant with
this internal preference, or an agent that prefers falsehood but happens to be discordant
with its internal preference. The equation for T˙− can be understood similarly. The
equations for F˙± are the same as those for T˙± by the transformation T± ↔ F± and
t ↔ f . Notice, as expected, that the densities of agents that intrinsically prefer truth
or falsehood are constant, that is, T˙ = T˙+ + T˙− = 0 and similarly F˙ = F˙+ + F˙− = 0.
Without loss of generality and as one might reasonably expect, we assume that a
majority of the agents intrinsically prefer the truth; that is, T ≥ 1
2
. To analyze the
rate equations (1), we introduce the linear combinations S = T+ + F+ (that ranges
between 0 and 1), and ∆ = T+ − F+ (that ranges between T − 1 = −F and T ). Using
T+ =
1
2
(S + ∆) and F+ =
1
2
(S − ∆), as well as T− = T − T+ and F− = F − F+, we
rewrite the rate equations (1) in terms of ∆, S, and T . Straightforward algebra leads
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S˙ = (2 + ǫt + ǫf )T (1− T )− (ǫt + ǫf )∆
2 +∆
[
2(1 + ǫt + ǫf )T − (1 +
1
2
ǫt +
3
2
ǫf)
]
−S + (ǫt − ǫf )
[
S(T −∆)− 1
2
S
]
, (2a)
∆˙ = (ǫt + ǫf)(T −∆)S + ǫf (∆− S) +
+(ǫt − ǫf )
[
T (1− T ) + 2T∆−∆2 − 1
2
(S +∆)
]
. (2b)
To understand the dynamical behavior of these equations, first consider the symmetric
(and simpler) case of ǫt = ǫf ≡ ǫ, in which each type of agent has the same degree of
preference toward internal concordance and the same reluctance for discordance. For
this special case, the nullclines of equations (1), S˙ = 0 and ∆˙ = 0, respectively, are:
S = 2(1 + ǫ)T (1− T )− 2ǫ∆2 + (1 + 2ǫ)(2T − 1)∆ ≡ f(∆) ,
(
S − 1
2
) [
∆− 1
2
(2T − 1)
]
= 1
4
(2T − 1) .
(3)
The locus S = f(∆) is monotonically increasing when ǫ < 2T − 1 but has a single
maximum when ǫ > 2T − 1, while the locus ∆˙ = 0 consists of two hyperbolae in
the ∆-S plane (figure 2). The intersections of these loci give the fixed points of the
dynamics. As illustrated in figure 2, there are two generic situations. For weak intrinsic
bias, ǫ < 2T − 1, there is a stable fixed point at (∆∗, S∗) = (T, T ) that corresponds to
truth consensus. In terms of the original densities T± and F±, this fixed point is located
at T+ = T and F+ = 0. Thus, truth consensus is reached in which the population
consists of: (i) agents that intrinsically prefer the truth and are concordant, and/or
(ii) agents that intrinsically prefer falsehood but are discordant (see figure 1). There is
also an unstable fixed point at (∆∗, S∗) = (T − 1, 1− T ) that corresponds to falsehood
consensus. For ǫ > 2T − 1, there exists an additional stable fixed point located at
(∆∗, S∗) =
(
1
2ǫ
(1 + ǫ)(2T − 1), 1
2
(1 + ǫ)
)
in the interior of the ∆-S plane. This fixed
point corresponds to a mixed state of impasse, where each agent tends to be aligned
with its own internal preference so that global consensus is not possible.
This same qualitative picture about the nature of the fixed points continues to
hold for general bias parameters ǫt 6= ǫf — consensus can be reached only when agents
are not too strongly biased toward internal concordance, while an impasse is reached
otherwise. A striking consequence of this model is that there is a substantial range
for the bias parameters ǫt and ǫf — and for values that seem socially realistic — for
which a consensus of the truth is not reached. To quantify this statement, we fix the
density of agents that intrinsically prefer the truth and study the final outcome of the
dynamics as a function of ǫt and ǫf . We make the natural assumption that a majority of
agents intrinsically prefer truth, T ≥ 1
2
. The transition between impasse and falsehood
consensus occurs when the fixed points corresponding to these two collective states
coincide. This gives the criterion
∆∗ = T − 1 =
T (2ǫt ǫf + ǫt + ǫf )− ǫt ǫf − ǫf
2ǫtǫf
. (4)
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Figure 2. Flow diagrams corresponding to the rate equations (1) when ǫt = ǫf ≡ ǫ in
the cases of: (a) weak bias ǫ < 2T − 1 and (b) strong bias ǫ > 2T − 1. The nullclines
defined by S˙ = 0 (solid) and ∆˙ = 0 (dashed) are shown, as well as the local flows near
each nullcline. The stable and unstable fixed points are denoted by filled and open
circles, respectively.
Similarly, the transition between impasse and truth consensus is defined by
∆∗ = T =
T (2ǫt ǫf + ǫt + ǫf )− ǫt ǫf − ǫf
2ǫtǫf
. (5)
These two equalities are satisfied when
ǫf = Tǫt/(1− T − ǫt) , (6a)
ǫf = Tǫt/(1− T + ǫt) , (6b)
respectively. These two loci are plotted in figure 3(a) for the representative case of
T = 0.8. The region between these two curves defines the part of the parameter space
where the final state is that of impasse. Surprisingly (or perhaps not), even when 80%
of the population intrinsically prefers truth, the impasse state can be reached even when
the bias ǫt toward the truth is stronger than the bias ǫf toward falsehood. Moreover,
this impasse state is reached for a wide range of bias parameters ǫt and ǫf .
To test these predictions and obtain additional empirical insights, we simulated the
partisan voter model on the ring and on the periodic square lattice. We studied two
natural initial conditions: (i) a random system and (ii) a droplet state. In the former,
we fix the fraction of voters that intrinsically believe the truth to be T = 0.8. For this
population, one-half of the agents are assigned the true opinion, independent of their
intrinsic beliefs. In the latter case, the system contains a small cluster of agents that
believe falsehood and also possess the false opinion, while all other agents believe the
truth and possess the true opinion. We study the evolution from these two initial states.
Figure 3(b) gives a temperature plot of the fractions of realizations that reach
consensus (either truth or falsehood) within a cutoff time 5000 as a function of ǫt and
ǫf for the random initial condition on the square lattice; qualitatively similar results
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Figure 3. Phase diagrams for the partisan voter model. (a) The attractor state of the
rate equations (1) as a function of the biases ǫt and ǫf when T = 0.8. (b) Simulation
results on a 20 × 20 square lattice for the randomly distributed initial state when
T = 0.8. (c) Simulation results on a 20× 20 square lattice for a clustered initial state
of 4× 4 agents in the falsehood state.
occur on the ring. The bright region for small ǫt and large ǫf corresponds to the system
reaching falsehood consensus within the cutoff time. Conversely, the bright region for
large ǫt and small ǫf corresponds to reaching truth consensus within the cutoff. In the
dark region, consensus has not yet been reached by the cutoff; we interpret this behavior
as corresponding to impasse.
The simulation results qualitatively mirror those predicted by the rate equations
in figure 3(a). However, since consensus must eventually occur in simulations of a finite
system, the lack of consensus by the cutoff indicates that the consensus time grows
exponentially with the system size in the dark region. This exponential time dependence
is a generic behavior that will occur whenever the intrinsic voting bias in the model tends
to drive the population away from consensus. Conversely, in the portions of the phase
diagram that correspond to truth and falsehood consensus, simulations of a finite system
will lead to a consensus time that generically grows logarithmically with the system size.
Figure 3(c) illustrates the evolution for an initial 4 × 4 droplet of falsehood (both
in belief and in current opinion) in a background of agents that believe the truth
and possess the true opinion; again, we obtain qualitatively similar results for the
corresponding one-dimensional system. Although a fraction T = 1 − 16/400 = 0.96
of the agents prefer the truth and are initially in the true state, impasse (in the sense
outlined above) is the long-time outcome for a substantial range of bias parameters.
That is, a small fraction of provocateurs — in the form of agents that steadfastly
believe falsehood — can forestall the attainment of consensus. Moreover, the range
of bias parameters for which impasse is reached is substantial and impasse can arise
even when partisans for truth are more strident than partisans for falsehood.
To summarize, we extended the voter model to include a competition between
conformity — the tendency to agree with one’s neighbors — and partisanship — the
desire to be in concordance with one’s fixed personal ethos. Analysis of the rate
equations shows that consensus can be prevented over a substantial range of model
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parameters. A sobering implication of our model is that a small minority of sufficiently
partisan agents that are inherently predisposed to falsehood can prevent the attainment
of consensus to truth. It should prove useful to test the validity of the partisan voter
model and its basic parameters from quantitative empirical data.
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